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Policy-based Population Projections for the European Union: 
A Complementary Approach*
Philip Cafaro, Patrícia Dérer
Abstract: We present new population projections out to 2100 for the countries of 
the European Union and for the EU as a whole under a wide range of fertility and 
migration scenarios. As policy-based projections rather than forecasts, they aspire 
not to maximize predictive success regarding future demographic developments, 
but to accurately show the impact of different migration and socio-economic policy 
choices on population numbers. Our chief aim is to clarify those policy choices for 
European citizens and policymakers. We show that demographic policies have the 
potential to markedly increase or decrease future populations across the EU. Mi-
gration policy offers greater scope for infl uencing future population numbers than 
policies aimed at infl uencing national fertility rates. In countries with particularly 
low fertility rates or high emigration levels, egalitarian economic and family support 
policies have the potential to limit future population decreases to a signifi cant ex-
tent, especially in combination. In most cases, EU nations are well placed to stabilize 
or slowly reduce their populations by continuing status quo policies or with moder-
ate changes. Thus they are well placed to achieve one of the necessary conditions 
for creating ecologically sustainable societies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present new, complementary population projections for the 28 
member countries of the European Union and for the EU as a whole. These projec-
tions, building on the work of Eurostat and numerous individual demographers, 
differ from previous national and region-wide projections primarily in projecting 
a wider range of fertility and migration scenarios farther out into the future than 
has typically been done and in linking these scenarios explicitly to policies. As 
policy-based projections rather than forecasts, they aspire not to maximize predic-
tive success regarding what will happen, but to accurately show the long-range 
demographic impacts of different policy choices, so as to clarify those choices for 
Europe’s leaders and citizens.
Our central claim is that these new projections clarify the population impact of 
a wide range of current policy choices better than recent projections from the UN, 
Eurostat, and national statistical bureaus. In addition, we ask these research ques-
tions:
1) How much can feasible family-support policies increase or decrease Euro-
pean populations?
2) How much can alternative migration policies do so, particularly over the long 
term?
3) Do changes to family-support policies or immigration numbers have the big-
ger potential to infl uence future population size within the European Union?
4) What regional differences exist among EU countries in terms of population 
futures and policy choices?
5) What policies might best mitigate excessive population decreases in extra 
low fertility or high emigration countries?
6) How can migration and fertility policies affect the extent of aging in the EU?
These new projections can also show which demographic policies lead toward 
stable or slowly decreasing populations in the densely populated EU and which 
toward higher ones – important information for citizens concerned to create eco-
logically sustainable societies. In what follows, we review recent efforts to project 
European populations (Section 2), describe our own scenario choices (Section 3) 
and projection methods (Section 4), present results and discuss answers to our 
research questions (Sections 5 and 6), and offer our main conclusions (Section 7).
2 Background
Successful countries need to make well-informed policy decisions. Today the na-
tions of the EU face policy choices that will infl uence their long-range demographic 
development, leading to a wide range of possible population futures. But we live 
in a rapidly changing world, including sudden fl uctuations in migration levels, with 
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unexpected demographic surprises, such as persistently low fertility rates in some 
developed nations. Aware of this demographic uncertainty, national statistical bu-
reaus tend to be leery of projecting more than a few decades into the future, and 
their alternative scenarios, if given at all, are usually narrowly constrained. This lim-
its the usefulness of their projections for long-range policy analysis, or for informing 
their citizens about the full range of policy options.
For example, the report presenting the most recent national population projec-
tions from Germany to a general audience shows only two fertility scenarios (1.4 
TFR and 1.6 TFR) and two migration scenarios (annual net migration of 100,000 and 
200,000) with higher fertility and migration scenarios relegated to model assump-
tions beside the main variants (Federal Statistical Offi ce of Germany 2015). Such a 
small variation in the total fertility rate arguably does not capture the fertility chang-
es possible through changes to family support programs or other economic policies 
(see discussion below). Similarly, the two immigration scenarios hardly account for 
the range of policy choices facing a country where annual net immigration has aver-
aged 259,000 over the past twenty years and varied widely (from – 56,000 in 2008 to 
1.2 million in 2015) and where there is widespread support both for greatly increas-
ing immigration (Social Democrats, Die Grünen) and greatly decreasing it (Christian 
Democratic Union, Alternative für Deutschland). The report makes no attempt to 
explicitly link different fertility rates and immigration numbers to particular policies. 
In addition, the projections only go out to 2060, with longer-term demographic im-
pacts left unexplored.
It is easy to lose sight of the goal of policy clarifi cation while pursuing predic-
tive rigor. Probabilistic population forecasts have begun to supplant traditional co-
hort-component projection methods, based on superior accuracy and their ability 
to quantify uncertainty (Wilson/Rees 2005; Azose et al. 2016). Recently the Italian 
national statistical bureau took this approach, using stochastic models to estimate 
future fertility, mortality and immigration trends, which they present with 90 per-
cent confi dence intervals (Istat 2018). Stochastic projection models may provide 
superior short-term forecasts, but an unremarked consequence of using them is 
that median scenarios with confi dence intervals tend to displace presentation of a 
variety of alternative scenarios – thus breaking any explicit connection between fu-
ture numbers and current policy choices. Il Futuro Demografi co Del Paese provides 
readers with a single median projection (with 90 percent confi dence intervals) of 
Italy’s future population out to 2065, with no alternative scenarios (Istat 2018). But 
fertility, mortality and migration trends can develop in different ways due to policy 
choices, and it would have been helpful to clarify these.
When we turn to region-wide projections, their value for policy clarifi cation also 
may be limited. Eurostat’s 2015 EU population projections run to 2080 and helpfully 
provide several alternative migration and fertility variants. Baseline scenarios are 
projected from recent trends by nowcast, convergence and trend models. TFRs for 
all countries are assumed to converge moderately to strongly around those of the 
highest fertility EU members, while net migration levels are assumed to converge 
relatively quickly around much lower levels (from ½ to ¼ of current levels by 2080) 
(Lanzieri 2017). Sensitivity tests are then provided for lower and higher migration 
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(+/- one third of the baseline net migration level) and for lower fertility (shrinkage of 
national fertility rates by 20 percent), but not for higher-than-baseline fertility. The 
projections provided in online tables (Eurostat 2019) are not clearly related to par-
ticular policy choices, nor do they cover the range of plausible alternatives, nor are 
the results explained in accessible summary publications. The resulting projections 
provide readers with little sense of how increases or decreases in net migration or 
fertility could impact future population numbers.
The most recent UN projections run to 2100 and use a probabilistic approach, 
resting on probabilistic fertility and mortality projections but deterministic migra-
tion projections (Raftery et al. 2014; United Nations 2017a). They assume gener-
ally constant levels of net migration until 2045-2050, which then gradually decline, 
reaching 50 percent of 2045-2050 levels by 2095-2100. Whatever the merits of this 
long-term forecast globally, it seems dubious for European countries, where migra-
tion pressures are strong and are projected to grow stronger during this century 
(Lutz et al. 2019). Only one alternative migration scenario is presented, the zero net 
migration variant; this allows readers to estimate the impact of status quo migration 
levels to future population numbers through 2050, but not much more. Regarding 
fertility, the UN follows the tradition and adds projections for +/- 0.5 of base TFR. 
Combined with a “constant fertility” scenario, where fertility rates remain at 2010-
2015 levels, this provides some sense of how future fertility rates might infl uence 
future national population numbers. However, this information is not presented per-
spicuously in summary publications (see United Nations 2017b). In any case, for 
low-fertility developed nations like those in the EU, a more fi ne-grained series of 
fertility and migration projections would be valuable – as well as some attempt to 
connect particular fertility and migration scenarios to particular policy choices.
The public typically regard any population projection as a forecast designed to 
predict the future (Booth 2006). However, several recent efforts helpfully project 
alternative futures without emphasizing the superior likelihood of any of the alterna-
tives projected. Such scenario-based projections emphasize that demography is 
not destiny and that policies can decisively infl uence demographic outcomes. The 
DEMIFER project (Demographic and Migratory Flows Affecting European Regions 
and Cities) is one effort to clearly link policy choices to demographic consequences 
using scenario designs (De Beer et al. 2010; Rees et al. 2012). Reasoning that fu-
ture demographic changes would be infl uenced less by specifi c demographic policy 
choices than by overall economic trends (which in turn infl uence policies), research-
ers developed four general scenarios. The complex scenarios depict more or less 
robust economies and more or less economic inequality within and between Euro-
pean regions. Researchers then calculated expected changes to fertility and mortal-
ity rates and immigration levels under each scenario. Their focus on NUTS2 regions 
provides a more fi ne-grained analysis than national projections and their holistic ap-
proach arguably captures well potential changes in fertility rates, given the fact that 
societies’ overall support for family formation infl uences these rates more strongly 
than one-off policy initiatives (Frejka 2008). But the approach fails to model Euro-
pean immigration policy choices, since future immigration levels, like current ones, 
will be set primarily by European governments rather than by economic trends.
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The recently updated global projections from the International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis provide the most ambitious approach we have seen linking 
policy choices to future population numbers. Building on the “shared socio-eco-
nomic pathways” developed for climate change analysis, (Lutz et al. 2018) develop 
three scenarios representing slow, medium and rapid socioeconomic development, 
each with associated fertility, mortality and migration levels. They then split their 
medium scenario into three based on different migration levels: zero net migration; 
continuation of the average net migration level between 1960 and 2015; and double 
that average. All fi ve of the ensuing projections are run out to 2100. The result is the 
most explicit picture we have seen of the potential for different migration levels to 
infl uence future EU population numbers. Unfortunately, the potential impact of fam-
ily support policies on future numbers is obscured, since their scenarios assume an 
implausibly large infl uence for increased education on future EU fertility levels, not 
taking into account already high European education levels and recent evidence for 
increased fertility among more educated women (Hazan/Zoabi 2015). They also mix 
changing fertility rates with changing migration and mortality levels in such a way 
as to render the impacts of family support policy choices opaque.
3 Scenarios
In general contrast to the approaches discussed above, our EU projections disag-
gregate the demographic impacts of fertility-focused policies and migration poli-
cies, presenting separate projections with multiple policy scenarios for each. We 
set the parameters for fertility rates and annual immigration numbers with reference 
to recent rates and numbers in status quo scenarios. Then we build additional sce-
narios by phasing in plausible changes to these rates and numbers, directly related 
to particular policy choices.
Our scenarios are informed by reference to recent policy choices made or ad-
vocated in the political sphere, and by analyses of the effectiveness of these poli-
cies in the recent demographic literature. Given the wide range of policy proposals 
currently under discussion in the public sphere, we have opted to consider a wider 
rather than a narrower range of projections.
3.1 Fertility scenarios
All European countries have completed the demographic transition to small families 
with long-lived members (Frejka 2008). While there is considerable variation (from 
a current TFR of 1.34 in Italy and Spain to 1.92 in France), no European country is at 
or above replacement fertility (Table 1).
Although a few analysts see low fertility and smaller populations as part of the 
natural evolution of successful societies (Matanle 2017; Götmark et al. 2018), most 
policy-makers see them as problems to be fought (European Commission 2014). 
Low fertility rates have induced EU nations to make a variety of attempts to raise 
them, including bonuses and tax breaks for having more children, and more gener-
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ous provision of child care services. Such efforts have been extensively studied. 
Despite mixed evidence in the literature (Gauthier et al. 2013), by now policy-makers 
have a fairly clear sense of what works best for permanently raising fertility levels 
in developed nations: comprehensive Nordic-style policies that make work-life bal-
ance easier for women and couples, combined with strong economic safety nets 
and more egalitarian societies (Thévenon/Gauthier 2011; Balbo et al. 2013; Poll-
mann-Schult 2018). We have also learned which policies do not work, or which only 
provide a short-term boost to fertility rates by infl uencing the timing of child-bear-
ing, rather than completed fertility. These include isolated payments to encourage 
larger families within unchanged contexts of economic or career insecurity (Kalwij 
2010; Kim 2014, although see Hong/Sullivan 2016 for some contrary evidence for 
the effectiveness of fertility subsidies.)
Given this general understanding, we have developed the fi ve family support 
policy scenarios summarized in table 2 below. In the status quo policy scenario, 
we imagine nations continuing their existing economic and family support policies. 
Under this scenario, we hold TFR steady for higher fertility countries (see Table 1) 
and phase in small fertility increases for lower and medium fertility countries, in 
line with prevailing trends and other recent projections. Then in our two egalitar-
ian policy scenarios, moderate and strong, we visualize countries enacting policies 
that make it easier for couples to form and sustain families, or creating more gener-
ous economic safety nets and doing more to redistribute wealth, so as to sustain a 
relatively egalitarian economic structure, or both. In contrast, in our two neo-liberal 
policy scenarios, moderate and strong, we imagine countries retreating from their 
Tab. 1: Fertility rates in 2016 for EU countries according to Eurostat, divided 
into three groups
Lower fertility countries Medium fertility countries Higher fertility countries
TFR < 1.5 TFR 1.5 < TFR < 1.7 TFR > 1.7
Italy 1.34 Austria 1.53 Latvia 1.74
Spain 1.34 Hungary 1.53 Denmark 1.79
Portugal 1.36 Bulgaria 1.54 United Kingdom 1.79
Cyprus 1.37 Finland 1.57 Ireland 1.81
Malta 1.37 Slovenia 1.58 Sweden 1.85
Greece 1.38 Estonia 1.60 France 1.92
Poland 1.39 Germany 1.60
Luxembourg 1.41 European Union 1.60
Croatia 1.42 Czech Republic 1.63
Slovakia 1.48 Romania 1.64
The Netherlands 1.66
Belgium 1.68
Lithuania 1.69
Source: Eurostat database, “Fertility indicators” table
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current levels of family support, cutting their economic safety nets, or encouraging 
greater economic inequality – or some combination of all three
A key question regarding these scenarios is the extent to which policy changes 
in one direction or the other will infl uence national fertility rates. There is much 
disagreement among demographers about the effectiveness of policy in infl uenc-
ing fertility (Luci-Greulich/Thévenon 2013). Yet that they have some infl uence seems 
undeniable. Hilgeman/Butts (2009: 113) found that improved access to childcare 
increased European fertility rates, predicting that if “Italy were to increase its enroll-
ment from 6 percent to 64 percent, to match that in Denmark, the realized fertility 
Tab. 2: Projection assumptions made under different family support scenarios. 
The impact on fertility is always phased in by 2036
Scenario Policy changes Impact on fertility rates
(1) status quo 
economic and family 
support policies
Continue existing level of 
family support, existing 
economic safety net, existing 
levels of economic equality 
and equality between the 
sexes
Lower fertility countries: 
+ 0.2 TFR
Medium fertility countries:
+ 0.1 TFR
Higher fertility countries: no 
change in TFR (2016 value)
(2) moderate 
egalitarian policy shift
Improve economic safety net, 
decrease economic inequality 
within society, increase 
policies that support family 
formation, commit to equality 
between the sexes
All three categories: status 
quo TFR + 0.15
(3) strong egalitarian 
policy shift 
Greatly improve economic 
safety net, greatly decrease 
economic inequality within 
society, greatly increase 
policies that support family 
formation, strongly commit to 
equality between the sexes
All three categories: status 
quo TFR + 0.3
(4) moderate neo-
liberal policy shift
Reduce economic safety net, 
accept growing economic 
inequality within society, 
decrease support for family 
formation, ignore inequality 
between the sexes
All three categories: status 
quo TFR - 0.15
(5) strong neo-liberal 
policy shift
Greatly reduce economic 
safety net, accept greatly 
increased economic inequality 
within society, greatly 
decrease support for family 
formation, ignore inequality 
between the sexes
All three categories: status 
quo TFR - 0.3 
Source: own design
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per woman would be predicted to increase by an average of 0.97 children.” (Adsera 
2004) concluded that the gap between desired and achieved fertility was lower for 
Spanish women with more secure public sector jobs than for those with less secure 
private sector jobs. Although Gauthier et al. 2013 argue that this “gap” is often over-
estimated and should not be used as evidence for the potential impact of family-
friendly policies, it is often cited as evidence at least for their possible impact (Eu-
ropean Commission 2005). One summary found small yet signifi cant increases in 
developed nations’ fertility rates under a wide range of policy interventions (OECD 
2011).
Acknowledging the uncertainty around this issue, we assume a relatively 
small but not insignifi cant space for family support and general economic policies 
to increase or decrease future fertility rates in the EU: plus or minus 0.15 TFR for our 
“moderate” policy change scenarios and plus or minus 0.30 TFR for our “strong” 
scenarios. This range is broadly in line both with studies that have looked at the im-
pacts of particular policies in particular EU countries and with the idea that the range 
of fertility rates exhibited among EU countries is partly but not wholly a function of 
different national policy choices. See appendix I for additional discussion.
3.2 Migration scenarios
Regarding migration, we develop a similarly wide range of policy-dependent sce-
narios, recognizing the greater uncertainty around future migration numbers com-
pared to future fertility rates (Azose et al. 2016). Migration numbers vary widely 
across the EU, as illustrated by table 3, showing individual countries’ average an-
nual net migration over the past twenty years. 
In recent decades, many EU countries have evolved from relatively low to rela-
tively high immigration regimes. More recently, high immigration levels have pro-
duced a strong populist reaction and some attempts to reduce these numbers, but 
whether this leads to permanently reduced immigration in the future remains to be 
seen. On the one hand, many EU citizens would like to see immigration reduced for 
social, economic, or political reasons (Connor/Krogstad 2018). They perceive cur-
rent immigration levels offering few benefi ts and considerable harms. On the other 
hand, many citizens (sometimes the same ones) feel a humanitarian obligation to 
help their poorer neighbors to the south and east by allowing more immigration. 
Many business leaders see increased immigration as the solution to the potential 
problem of shrinking numbers of workers and consumers (Legrain 2014; d’Albis et 
al. 2018), a view echoed by EU policy-makers (European Commission 2005, 2014).
The situation is fl uid and the sheer range of immigration policies advocated by 
European political parties is impressive. We seek to capture this range in our projec-
tions, with the following fi ve migration scenarios for those countries (20 out of 28) 
that have averaged net positive migration over the past twenty years:
We build the status quo net migration scenario by averaging annual net migra-
tion into a country for the past twenty years and projecting it out to 2100 (note that 
our status quo net migration scenario is identical to our status quo fertility policy 
scenario). Such a lookback period roughly mirrors contemporary policies and con-
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ditions, while smoothing out yearly fl uctuations. We then build four further scenari-
os around the status quo scenario: 2X and 4X status quo scenarios, which increase 
immigration, and a zero net migration scenario and half status quo scenario, which 
decrease it. See appendix I for further details.
We treat the eight EU countries where emigration has exceeded immigration on 
average over the last two decades somewhat differently. For these countries, which 
are all in Eastern Europe, we have built a status quo net migration scenario around 
continued negative net migration, again taking the average annual net migration lev-
el for the past twenty years as a starting reference but linearly increasing it to zero in 
2100 (in this way, gradually increasing net migration compensates for a decreasing 
total population that could not support large constant negative net migration levels). 
We then project a zero net migration scenario, reaching equal numbers of emigrants 
and immigrants by 2026, and three positive net migration scenarios built around 
applying a multiple of the average annual net migration rate for the EU as a whole 
during the past twenty years to the countries in question, out to 2100. These higher 
net migration scenarios thus assume convergence in migration patterns across the 
EU, as Eastern countries catch up to Western ones by being more open to immigra-
tion from outside the EU while fewer of their own citizens emigrate.
As with our fertility scenarios, we believe our migration scenarios well capture 
the range of policy choices facing EU countries today. These two sets of fi ve alterna-
tives present the full gamut of policy choices on immigration: from drastically cur-
tailing it to drastically expanding it; from the Sweden Democrats to Sweden’s Green 
Party. Several readers of this study in manuscript have questioned the feasibility 
Tab. 3: Average annual net migration (1998-2017) of EU countries
Source: calculated from Eurostat database,”Population change – Demographic balance 
and crude rates at national level” table
Countries with positive average annual net migration Countries with negative 
average annual net 
migration
European Union 1,188,235
Spain 270,112 Ireland 21,645 Slovakia -305
Germany 259,316 Czech Republic 18,747 Estonia -942
United Kingdom 230,107 Denmark 16,778 Croatia -4,259
Italy 229,093 Hungary 13,652 Poland -12,552
France 100,525 Portugal 12,262 Latvia -14,362
Sweden 50,024 Finland 11,104 Bulgaria -21,052
Belgium 42,575 Greece 8,390 Lithuania -27,212
Austria 40,547 Luxembourg 6,967 Romania -103,807
The Netherlands 26,427 Cyprus 5,855
Slovenia 4,128
Malta 3,642
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of the zero net migration and 4X net migration scenarios for positive net migration 
countries. We agree that these more extreme scenarios are less likely to occur than 
the more modest policy changes characterized within the range of our half status 
quo to 2X status quo scenarios; that is why we graph them with dotted lines rather 
than straight lines in our projections. Yet given the overriding goal of these projec-
tions – to clarify the potential demographic impact of current policy choices – we 
believe these policy options should be included in our analysis.
A long-term zero net migration scenario for high-immigration countries in west-
ern and northern Europe is unlikely. Yet “no international migration” scenarios are 
included in the population projections of many national statistical bureaus and aca-
demic demographers, serving as reference scenarios to decompose the impacts of 
internal population changes and international migration. Similarly, migration levels 
equal to 4X these countries’ recent net migration are highly unlikely to be sustained 
for many decades. The 4X net migration scenario thus is best seen as a “what if” 
scenario, allowing us to ask: “what might the demographic results be if a country 
persisted in allowing very high levels of immigration?”
Several EU governments allowed unprecedented immigration for a time in 2015 
and 2016; in the case of Germany, this resulted in even higher net migration in 2015 
than would occur under our 4X status quo migration scenario. Exploring the pos-
sible demographic impacts of persisting in such a course is valuable, even if such 
Tab. 4: Projection assumptions under different migration scenarios for 
countries with net positive migration
Scenario Annual net migration level Fertility rate assumptions
(1) status quo net 
migration
Continuation of the country’s 
average annual net migration 
level for the past 20 years for 
the rest of the century
TFR the same as under status 
quo fertility scenarios
(2) 2X status quo net 
migration
2X average annual net 
migration level by 2026, held 
stable for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR + 0.05 by 
2036
(3) 4X status quo net 
migration
4X average annual net 
migration level by 2026, held 
stable for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR + 0.2 by 2036
(4) half status quo net 
migration
½ average annual net 
migration level by 2026, held 
stable for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR - 0.025 by 
2036
(5) zero net migration Zero net migration by 2026, 
held stable for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR - 0.05 by 2036
Source: own design
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persistence is unlikely. Similarly, for other countries, the 4X status quo net migration 
scenario allows us to ask: “what might the demographic results be if a country al-
lowed open borders?” Europe’s Green parties explicitly advocated an open borders 
immigration policy in the 2019 European parliamentary elections (European Greens 
2019a/b), and many EU social democratic parties have joined them in resisting ef-
forts to set numerical limits to refugee admissions into the EU while simultaneously 
pushing for a much more expansive defi nition of refugees (Žižek 2016). Truly open 
borders are hard to model, but the 4X status quo scenario seems to us a good proxy 
for such an unlikely but possible course of action, showing its possible demograph-
ic impact. See appendix I for further discussion.
Finally, we note that family support and migration policies can and will change si-
multaneously. For that reason, we also project several combination scenarios in an 
attempt to better understand the full range of potential demographic futures facing 
EU countries and the impacts that policy choices may have on them. We describe 
these combination scenarios in section 5 of appendix I. We present them, along with 
all our scenario projections, in appendix III.
Tab. 5: Projection assumptions under different migration scenarios for 
countries with net negative migration
Scenario Annual net migration level Fertility rate assumptions
(1) status quo net 
migration
Linear increase from average 
annual net migration for the 
past 20 years to zero by 2100
Status quo TFR 
(2) zero net migration Zero net migration by 2026, 
held stable for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR
(3) EU status quo net 
migration rate
Net migration level equal to 
the recent average EU net 
migration rate by 2026, held 
constant for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR + 0.05 by 2036
(4) 2X EU status quo 
net migration rate
Net migration level equal to 
2X the recent average EU net 
migration rate by 2026, held 
constant for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR + 0.1 by 2036
(5) 4X EU status quo 
net migration rate
Net migration level equal to 
4X the recent average EU net 
migration rate by 2026, held 
constant for the rest of the 
century
Status quo TFR + 0.2 by 2036
Source: own design
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4 Methods
Our population projections employ the deterministic cohort-component method. 
We used DemProj program version 5.71, part of the Spectrum policy development 
and planning tool developed by Avenir Health (Stover/Kirmeyer 2007; Stover et al. 
2010). The program requires information on population numbers by age and sex in 
the base year (2016 in all scenarios), as well as current year data and future assump-
tions about total fertility rate (TFR), age distribution of fertility, life expectancy at 
birth by sex, the most appropriate model life table, and the magnitude and pattern 
of international migration. In order to calculate dependency ratios, median age and 
proportion of 65+ population throughout the projections, we also used the DemProj 
module of Spectrum.
Our source for baseline 2016 data on population numbers by sex and single 
age (0-80+), national TFRs, life expectancy at birth and net migration fi gures, is the 
European Statistical Offi ce (Eurostat). We use 2016 as our base year because at 
the time we made the projections, that was the most recent year for which actual 
TFR fi gures were available. Age specifi c fertility rates follow the United Nations’ 
most recent world population projections’ country specifi c fertility distribution data 
(United Nations 2017a). For changes to life expectancy, we use the sex specifi c as-
sumptions of the baseline scenario of the Eurostat 2015 population projections until 
2080, then hold these constant through the end of the century. In order to work with 
age-specifi c mortality rates, we use the UN’s country specifi c model life tables.
To model the impact of changes in migration levels, we constructed status quo 
scenarios by averaging Eurostat’s annual national net migration fi gures for 1998 
to 2017, then built alternative scenarios on multiples of that base. As we were not 
forecasting but building what-if policy scenarios, a model using readily available net 
migration level data was satisfactory for our purposes, although we are aware that 
multiregional models such as MULTIPOLES (Kupiszewski/Kupiszewska 2011) based 
on immigration levels and emigration rates are more accurate and methodologically 
elegant (Rogers 1990). Similarly, we did not attempt to model regional, sub-national 
migration, nor to classify different migration fl ows by motive, such as employment 
versus asylum seeking,  nor did we distinguish between immigrants coming from 
EU countries or outside the European Union. Such approaches may provide a more 
fi ne-grained picture. But our focus in this study was squarely on national net migra-
tion levels, since a primary goal was to model the future demographic impacts of 
migration policy, which is made primarily at the national level. Concerning “net mi-
grants,” we assume equal proportions between the sexes and the DemProj program 
uses the UN’s country-specifi c migration age distributions.
All changes to TFR in our scenarios assume a linear change phased in between 
2016 and 2036, while all changes to net migration rates are phased in between 2016 
and 2026. Appendix II provides tables showing the projection parameters (life ex-
pectancy, fertility rates and net migration levels) set for all scenarios across all coun-
tries in the study. Appendix III provides detailed population projections for all EU 
member states and the EU as a whole, in chart and table form.
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5 Results
To begin summarizing our results, consider our projections for the European Union 
as a whole. The current 28 countries in the EU had a combined population in 1950 
of 379.8 million and 510.3 million in 2016. The region’s current (2016) total fertility 
rate is 1.60 and its annual net migration level over the past 20 years (1998-2017) 
averaged 1,188,235.
Under a continuation of status quo family support and economic policies and an 
extension of current immigration levels in every country, we can expect a 3.6 per-
cent decrease in the EU population (Fig. 1). This would hardly be overwhelming, 
spread out over eight decades. A relatively modest turn toward less generous sup-
port for family formation, under the moderate neoliberal scenario, would acceler-
ate population decrease, leading instead to a 14.2 percent population decline. On 
the other hand, more generous support for workers and their families, under the 
moderate egalitarian scenario, would increase fertility rates suffi ciently to avoid any 
population decline, even adding 27 million people to the total EU population. Given 
wide disparities among EU countries in economic support systems, commitments 
to egalitarian relations between the sexes and fi nancial support for having children, 
there seems suffi cient scope for enacting such policies and thus avoiding a decline 
if that is desired. The full range of fertility-related policy scenarios (dashed lines on 
fi gure 1), from strong neoliberal to strong egalitarian policies, leads to populations 
ranging in 2100 from 396.8 million (a 22 percent decline) to 592.3 million (a 16 per-
cent increase): almost a 200 million spread.
Fig. 1: European Union population projections under fi ve fertility scenarios. All 
scenarios assume the continuation of the past 20 years average annual 
net migration on the EU level
Source: own calculations
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Altering immigration levels provides much greater scope for increasing or de-
creasing the total EU population, compared to changing fertility-related policies on 
the country level – an important result that also holds for most individual countries 
(Fig. 2). Cutting net average migration in half would reduce the EU population by an 
additional 70 million people, or an extra 14 percent compared to the population loss 
under the status quo scenario, for a total drop of 24 percent by 2100. Doubling net 
migration, conversely, would switch the EU’s population from declining by 52.6 mil-
lion (10 percent) under the status quo to growing by 92.0 million (18 percent). That’s 
a swing of 214.6 million people across our most likely range of immigration policy 
changes. The spread across the full range of policy choices is much greater: over 
600 million people, from swelling to 933.3 million in 2100 in the case of quadrupling 
status quo net migration numbers (an 83 percent increase), to contracting to only 
318.9 million by reducing net migration to zero (a 38 percent decline).
Our combination scenarios add further detail to the picture (see appendices I 
and III for details). Doubling recent average net migration levels across the EU while 
improving family support through egalitarian social and economic policies leads to 
a 38 percent population increase by the end of the century. In contrast, cutting im-
migration in half and cutting back on social and economic support for family forma-
tion leads to a population decline of over two hundred million people (a 40 percent 
decline). Interestingly, halving recent net migration levels combined with strong 
improvements in family support leads to a relatively stable population (decreasing 
Fig. 2: European Union population projections under fi ve fertility scenarios. 
Status quo migration is the continuation of the past 20 years average 
annual net migration level (1,188,235). Migration scenarios use total 
fertility rates varying between 1.65 and 1.90, with higher immigration 
levels projected to drive higher TFRs
Source: own calculations
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only 3.6 percent by the end of the century). This might be a particularly appealing 
policy combination on a continent where support for mass immigration has waned 
while concerns about low fertility levels remain strong.
5.1 Regional differences
Despite their shared experience passing through “the second demographic transi-
tion,” EU nations all face somewhat different population futures and policy choices. 
In particular, it is worth highlighting the substantial differences among four regions 
of the EU.
Central and Eastern Europe
Under status quo policies, many low fertility and/or net emigration countries in this 
region are on track for steep population declines this century.1 These include Ro-
mania, facing a 74 percent decline by 2100, Bulgaria (60 percent), the Baltic states 
(between 38 percent and 86 percent) and Hungary, facing a decline of 29 percent by 
2100. However, egalitarian economic and social policies could mitigate population 
declines among this group by increasing fertility rates and (potentially) decreas-
ing emigration numbers. In tandem with modestly increased immigration, much of 
the projected depopulation could be avoided. For example, under a combination 
scenario of zero net migration fused with strong family support policies, Romania’s 
population decline shrinks to 22 percent by 2100, while under the same scenario 
over the same time-frame, Bulgaria’s population only decreases 28 percent. Add 
positive net immigration at the current EU level and these populations would in-
stead increase, Romania by 17 percent and Bulgaria by 6 percent.
Hungary, which has had small positive net migration over the past twenty years, 
could limit its population decline to 11 percent by holding net migration steady and 
embracing strong family support policies. Instead, its current government has pro-
posed the sort of pro-natalist policies that have proven ineffective in the past, such 
as subsidies to encourage families to have three or four children. More effective, 
both narrowly in terms of increasing fertility and broadly in terms of social well-
being, would be policies to help young couples have the one or two children many 
of them want, without having to sacrifi ce their careers or go into poverty.
Southern Europe
Low fertility/high net migration countries in this region are propping up population 
numbers through high immigration levels under status quo policies. Without heavy 
immigration, Spain’s and Italy’s populations would already be declining, since their 
TFRs have been below replacement rate since the early 1980s and are now well be-
low it. Under zero net migration scenarios, Spain’s population decreases by 46 per-
1 Sobotka (2003) argues that the countries of Central Europe and Eastern Europe are following 
somewhat different paths, the former moving toward western European norms of later child-
rearing and the latter shifting toward larger proportions of one-child families.
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cent and Italy’s by over 50 percent by 2100. These countries cannot cut back sig-
nifi cantly on immigration without either embracing egalitarian economic and family 
support policies to increase fertility rates, or accepting signifi cant population de-
clines this century.
Greece and Portugal, averaging more modest positive net migration over the 
past twenty years, instead face steep population declines in coming decades un-
der status quo scenarios and all projected fertility scenarios. Their choices going 
forward are somewhat similar to Italy’s and Spain’s, however: accept higher net mi-
gration numbers, boost support for family-formation and create stronger economic 
safety nets for common citizens in order to maintain their populations, or accept 
rapid population decline. Interestingly, for Italy and Spain, the status quo scenario 
and a scenario combining half status quo migration and a strong egalitarian shift in 
family support policies lead to relatively similar results, coalescing around a fairly 
stable population, while for Greece and Portugal this combination scenario leads 
to signifi cantly less population loss. A combination of increased support for fam-
ily formation and decreased immigration might be appealing to many residents of 
these countries, especially given relatively high unemployment rates throughout 
the region.
Northern European countries 
With high fertility and high immigration levels these countries will see signifcant 
population growth this century under status quo policies, and some growth un-
der most plausible policy scenarios. An example is Sweden, which is on track to 
increase its population 52 percent by 2100 under status quo fertility and immigra-
tion policies. Increases in immigration levels could lead to much larger populations 
throughout northern Europe, as seen in the table below:
With wealthy societies, low population densities (by European standards) and 
a post-war tradition in some countries of taking in large numbers of refugees, sig-
nifi cant increases in immigration levels are a real possibility – although there is also 
considerable opposition to such increases, as demonstrated in recent elections.
Tab. 6: Percentage change from current population by 2100, under different 
immigration scenarios in Northern Europe. Scenarios leading to 
> 50 percent population increase are shaded
Zero net ½ status Status quo 2X status 4X status
migration quo migration quo quo
Denmark - 19 - 2 16 54 142
Finland - 35 - 22 - 11 15 71
Sweden - 9 23 52 124 276
Source: own calculations
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Western European countries 
With medium to high fertility and high immigration levels, these countries are most-
ly on track for relatively stable to moderately increasing populations under status 
quo policy scenarios (Table 7). While increases in immigration levels could lead to 
much larger populations, such as increases of 186 percent in Belgium and 167 per-
cent in the UK under our highest immigration scenario, decreases could lead to 
signifi cantly smaller ones, such as a 38 percent decline in Germany and a 24 percent 
decrease in the Netherlands at zero net migration. As in the rest of Europe, policy-
induced changes in fertility rates could also change future population numbers sub-
stantially, albeit to a lesser extent.
5.2 Impact on population aging
Fertility and migration policies will have only a moderate infl uence on the pace of 
future population aging, with migration policy changes having a stronger potential 
impact. For the EU-28 population, the proportion of the population 65 years and 
older and the dependency ratio will be higher in 2100 than they are today under all 
scenarios (Table 8), so some aging is inevitable. Of all the scenarios, increasing long 
term average net migration 4 times would do the most to slow the pace of aging, 
with the dependency ratio increasing 10 percent instead of 17 percent as under the 
status quo scenario, while increasing the proportion of the population 65 years + by 
2.2 percent instead of 7.2 percent. But in exchange for these modest improvements, 
these immigration policy changes would add an extra 475 million people to the total 
EU population (933 million instead of 458 million under the status quo scenario).
Pursuing the strong egalitarian family policy scenario would improve the de-
pendency ratio roughly as much as under the 2X status quo migration scenario. In 
the other direction, the strong neoliberal family policy scenario would increase the 
Tab. 7: Percentage increase from current population by 2100, under different 
immigration scenarios in Western Europe. Scenarios leading to 
> 50 percent population increase are shaded
Zero net ½ status Status quo 2X status 4X status
migration quo net migration quo quo
Austria -36 -9 16 72 195
Belgium -23 >-1 26 74 186
Czech Republic -37 -25 -14 8 61
France -9 2 13 35 88
Germany -38 -19 -2 37 123
Ireland -6 23 51 111 245
Luxembourg -33 50 117 267 600
The Netherlands -24 -12 -2 25 82
United Kingdom -18 3 24 68 167
Source: own calculations
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percentage of the population 65+ by an additional 4.4 percent in 2100, comparable 
to the zero net migration scenario, while it would increase the dependency ratio by 
an additional 4.5 percent, comparable to cutting immigration to one quarter of cur-
rent levels. But once again, the impacts on total population numbers would dwarf 
the impacts on aging.
5.3  Comparison with other studies
Our fertility and migration scenarios give projection results that are roughly compa-
rable to the results from other recent European-wide studies, while linking those re-
sults more clearly to available policy choices. Compare in this regard our migration 
scenario projections to recent projections from Eurostat (2015), the United Nations 
(2017b) and the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 
(2018) in fi gure 3 below.
Results from our zero net migration, status quo and 2X status quo scenarios are 
broadly comparable to the no migration, median or “most likely,” and high migration 
projections from these other studies. The clear outlier is our 4X status quo scenario 
which graphs a much higher sustained high immigration level than any major study 
to date. The justifi cation for providing this scenario has already been provided. Note 
that the supply is already in place, with hundreds of millions of young people in the 
developing world living in rapidly-growing societies that struggle to provide them 
with the jobs and material well-being they desire. Whether EU countries (or the EU 
as a whole, under a strengthened centralized government) will enact policies that 
increase immigration this much is doubtful, yet possible.
6 Discussion
What conclusions can we draw from these projections regarding our main research 
 questions? We would direct attention to fi ve key points.
(1) Migration policy offers greater scope for infl uencing future population num-
bers than changes to family support policies, or changes to other fertility-
related economic policies in the EU.
Changing fertility does infl uence population size. But in a context of relatively 
low-fertility regimes where policy changes’ impacts on fertility are often fairly small, 
changes to national immigration levels could have a much greater impact going 
forward.
For Germany, Europe’s most populous country, the more likely scenarios for fer-
tility variation range between 1.55 TFR and 1.85 TFR, leading to a potential differ-
ence of 15.4 million people in 2100 (72.9 million versus 88.3 million) (fi gure 4). In 
contrast, the three more likely net migration scenarios generate a 3X greater spread, 
ranging across 46.6 million people (Fig. 5). Considering the full range of fertility 
change scenarios, including less likely but still possible low and high scenarios of 
1.4 TFR to 2.0 TFR, doubles the potential range across Germany’s 2100 population 
to 31.1 million. But considering the full range of possible migration scenarios in-
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creases the 2100 population spread by over 100 million more. While the full range 
of fertility scenarios all lead to populations in 2100 that are broadly commensurate 
with Germany’s present population of 82.2 million (80 percent to 118 percent of cur-
rent numbers), the extreme migration scenarios would lead to much more drastic 
changes: from 62 percent of the current population under the lowest scenario to 
223 percent under the highest. Similar results, with much higher ranges across mi-
gration scenarios than fertility scenarios, obtain for most EU countries and for the 
EU as a whole, as we saw earlier.
(2) Egalitarian economic and family support policies and increased net migration 
have signifi cant potential to mitigate excessive population decreases in the 
EU’s lower fertility countries.
Fig. 3: Comparing the policy-based migration scenarios for 28 EU member 
states in the present study with the migration scenarios in other 
published region-wide or world-wide studies
Sources: a – own calculation; b – Eurostat Database 2015; c – United Nations Popula-
tion Prospects 2017; d – Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human 
Capital 2018.
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Several eastern European countries with low fertility levels and high emigration 
rates are on track for rapid depopulation this century. While the dangers of small 
population decreases are often overblown, too large or too quick decreases could 
Fig. 4: Germany population projections under fi ve fertility scenarios: All 
scenarios assume the continuation of the past 20 years average annual 
net migration level (259,316) 
Source: own calculations
Fig. 5: Germany population projections under fi ve migration scenarios: Status 
quo migration is the continuation of the past 20 years average annual 
net migration level (259,316). Migration scenarios use total fertility 
rates varying between 1.65 and 1.90, with higher immigration levels 
projected to drive higher TFRs
Source: own calculations
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cause social problems in these societies (Rees et al. 2012; Jakovljevic/Laaser 2015). 
So it is good to know that part of this potential decrease could be avoided by adopt-
ing the economic and family support policies that have proven so successful at 
boosting fertility rates and improving lives in northern Europe. Consider Poland, the 
most populous EU country facing signifi cant population decline (see projections in 
appendix III).
Under status quo policies that provide little support for women who want to 
combine careers with creating a family (Mishtal 2009), Poland’s population is set 
to decline 44 percent by the end of the century. Combining increased net migration 
up to the current EU status quo net migration rate with a strong increase in sup-
port for family formation would instead increase Poland’s total population 4 percent 
by 2100. Similar refl ections apply to Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Greece and 
other countries in eastern and southern Europe that could see signifi cant population 
losses over the next 80 years. It is particularly noteworthy that some of the same 
economic policies that could raise national fertility rates would also increase eco-
nomic security, possibly decreasing emigration by younger workers. While these 
policies, such as improved child-care programs and paid family leave for workers, 
are expensive, they hold out hope for a slow, manageable population decrease rath-
er than a precipitous decline in these countries (Frejka/Gietel-Basten 2016).
(3) In most cases, EU nations are well placed to stabilize or slowly reduce their 
populations–thus achieving one of the necessary conditions for creating eco-
logically sustainable societies.
We can see this in many of the status quo scenarios, which tend to stay relatively 
fl at throughout the 21st century: often within 10 percent of current population fi g-
ures (Holland, Italy, Germany) and if not, then within 20 percent of current numbers 
(France, Spain, Denmark, Czech Republic). In replenishing their populations, these 
countries have room to shift the balance somewhat between immigration and births 
to citizens, either in one direction or the other, while still keeping their populations 
stable or moderately declining. This can be seen by comparing the status quo fertil-
ity and migration scenarios with the ½ net migration/strong family support policy 
combination scenarios in Table 9.
A few countries, like Belgium and the United Kingdom, are set for larger popula-
tion increases this century under a continuation of status quo fertility and migra-
tion policies. Such increases could be mitigated by decreasing immigration levels, 
which would likely be more popular than decreasing fertility rates by cutting eco-
nomic safety nets or support for family formation. On the other hand, higher net 
migration levels could lead to much high population growth across the continent.
(4) An egalitarian shift in family support policies or increasing immigration lev-
els are not effective remedies for population aging in the EU.
In accordance with other recent studies (Craveiro et al. 2019; Lutz et al. 2019) 
and contrary to many political discussions, encouraging more immigration from 
external countries into the EU or increasing fertility rates by means of successful 
government initiatives will not signifi cantly slow population aging in the EU. Even 
increasing net migration levels 4 times would do little in the long-term to reduce 
the dependency ratio or the proportion of the population 65 years or older (see 
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Table 8). This is due to the fact that immigrants, like non-immigrants, age and retire, 
requiring social benefi ts and medical care. The fertility scenarios discussed in the 
present paper show an even smaller impact on aging measures than our migration 
scenarios. Meanwhile fertility and especially immigration increases show a much 
greater capacity for increasing total population numbers.
In exchange for a small improvement in dependency ratios in 2100 (66.5 instead 
of 70.0 under the status quo), doubling net immigration into the EU over that period 
would add 145 million more residents to the total population (602 million rather 
than 458 million). Increasing immigration 4X would improve the dependency ratio 
slightly more, to 63.2. But that would still be a full ten points higher than today’s 
53.2 and in exchange the EU would have to support 475 million more people than it 
would under a status quo migration scenario – with all the increased environmen-
tal demands (Marques et al. 2019) and social contention (Harmon 2018) that such 
increased numbers imply. The moral is that to the extent aging societies create 
economic problems, the most effective remedies will involve increasing labor-force 
participation and other systemic changes, rather than increasing either net migra-
tion or fertility rates (Götmark et al. 2018).
Tab. 9: Percentage change from current population by 2100, under four policy 
scenarios, for the EU’s ten most populous countries. Scenarios resulting 
in relatively stable populations (+/- 15 percent) highlighted
Status quo ½ status quo 2X status quo 2X status quo
migration & migration & migration & migration & 
status quo strong egalitarian status quo strong egalitarian
family support policy shift family support policy shift
Germany -2 0 37 58
France 13 28 35 59
UK 24 29 68 90
Italy -8 -13 34 54
Spain 19 5 83 107
Poland -26a --- 12b 36c
Romania -5a --- 31b 59c
The Netherlands -2 11 25 46
Belgium 26 23 74 105
Greece -36 -25 -25 -11
EU total -10 -4 18 38
a Shows the EU status quo migration rate & status quo family support scenario
b Shows the 2X EU status quo migration rate & status quo family support scenario
c Shows the 2X EU status quo migration rate & strong egalitarian policy shift scenario
Source: own calculations
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(5) Demographic policies have the potential to signifi cantly raise or lower future 
populations, and hence to make it harder or easier for EU nations to create 
ecologically sustainable societies.
In a world where the population growth rate is slowing down and most future 
population growth is projected for the developing world, it is easy to overlook the 
importance of demographic policies to developed countries’ futures. Arguably this 
is misguided. Many western and northern European nations are pursuing popula-
tion policies that could signifi cantly increase their populations in the coming years 
and hence increase their countries’ total ecological footprint, which is a function of 
the size of their population and their per capita consumption of resources (Lin et al. 
2019). Ceteris paribus, more people mean more consumption and pollution, more 
greenhouse gases emitted, etc. (IPCC 2014; Díaz et al. 2019). There is abundant 
evidence that humanity’s current biophysical demands are already far in excess of 
what is ecologically sustainable (Ripple et al. 2017) and this problem must be tack-
led both by decreasing overconsumption and ending population growth.
Other EU countries, whose fertility levels could lead to shrinking populations 
and hence help lessen their environmental footprints, are instead bolstering their 
populations through historically high immigration levels. Germany, Italy and Spain 
are important examples. Spain, with a current TFR of 1.34, is on track to increase its 
population by 8.5 million by 2100. With the same low current TFR, Italy’s population 
will decrease by only 3.5 million people this century under the status quo. Accept-
ing rapid population decline is probably not to be expected of any nation’s lead-
ers. But accepting some population decrease in wealthy, crowded societies may be 
advisable, given the environmental benefi ts of smaller populations (Matanle 2017; 
Pilling 2018). 
7 Conclusion
In developing new policy-based population projections, we have shown that some 
policy choices have the potential to substantially increase future European pop-
ulation numbers. Both family support and migration policies will infl uence these 
numbers, with migration policies likely having the greatest impact. The potential 
increases under more expansive policy scenarios would not be as large, either as 
a percentage change or in absolute numbers, as those that occurred in India and 
China during the past century, or those being predicted for Africa during this one. 
This fact should not mislead us. Increasing Europe’s population by even 100 million 
more people would be a very big “ask” on nature; decreasing it by 100 million peo-
ple would be a substantial gift. As a matter of de facto environmental policy, demo-
graphic decisions will be at least as important as any other policy courses charted 
by EU nations this century, since they impact all aspects of a country’s environmen-
tal situation. In a recent working paper, we use these projections to explore popula-
tion policies’ potential impacts on future efforts to reduce the EU’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and preserve its biodiversity (Cafaro/Dérer 2018).
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Precisely how demographic policies impact such efforts demands further study 
(Rust/Kehoe 2017). So do population policies’ impacts on economic equality and 
social solidarity. By tying our population projections more explicitly to actual policy 
options than previous efforts, we hope to facilitate other researchers’ efforts to ask 
and answer such questions. By providing a full range of population projections for 
all the countries of the EU, we believe we have made it easier for concerned citizens 
from these countries to do so, as well.
According to the UN Human Development Index, European nations are among 
the world leaders in terms of health and longevity; in wealth and sharing that wealth 
equitably; in securing honest governments that serve their citizens and uphold the 
rule of law; and in promoting tolerance and ensuring human rights (United Nations 
Development Programme 2018). But the EU’s demographic challenges and opportu-
nities are complex. Which population policies will best sustain fl ourishing societies 
remains to be determined. Getting this right is important in Europe – and beyond. A 
world caught up in an economic system built around the uncritical pursuit of growth 
and bumping up against ecological limits (O’Neill et al. 2018) needs to see that the 
socio-economic challenges of aging and shrinking societies are inevitable but man-
ageable (Götmark et al. 2018) and that international solidarity can be combined with 
demographic responsibility (Cafaro 2015).
As we have shown, most EU countries are well placed to stabilize or slowly re-
duce their populations. Europeans’ great contribution in the twenty-fi rst century 
could be to model successful societies that do not depend on continued growth, but 
that instead prioritize societal well-being and an acceptance of limits (Kallis 2018). 
We hope these population projections are a useful tool for exploring such questions 
and ultimately for imagining and creating such societies.
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